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Günter Joetze 
The European Security Landscape  
after Kosovo 
Operation "Allied Force" was a decisive new element in European security. 
Some may call it a watershed—or "Wegscheide" (crossroad, Foreign 
Minister Fischer's expression before the UN General Assembly on 
September 22, 1999). The general consequences of the Kosovo events, will 
first be analyzed, following then, the consequences for the Security and 
Foreign Policy of the European Union.  
1. General consequences of the Kosovo events 
1.1 Military enforcement of humanitarian aims: a new doctrine or a 
doubtful precedent? 
In an interview on June 20, President Clinton stated as "an important 
principle...that whether within or beyond the borders of a country, if the 
world community has the power to stop it, we ought to stop genocide". He 
repeated this idea in a speech before NATO troops in Macedonia in more 
solemn terms.
1 This led observers like Jim Hoagland
2 to assume the 
development of a "Clinton Doctrine" of humanitarian warfare.  
At the Munich Wehrkunde Convention in February 1999, Chancellor 
Schröder would not exclude Germany´s participation in further military 
 
1  White House Press Release of June 20, 1999 (Interview of the President by Wolf 
Blitzer CNN late edition). 
2  "Developing a Doctrine of Humanitarian Warfare", in International Herald Tribune, 
June 28, 1999. Günter Joetze 
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interventions with the aim to prevent "extraordinary humanitarian 
catastrophes" if need be again without a UN mandate.  
Do these spontaneous remarks by NATO leaders initiate a new doctrine, or 
does Operation "Allied Force" rather present, in the words of a British 
analyst, a "questionable model of humanitarian intervention"
3? The 
operation could not prevent the expulsion of the Kosovars, so it did not 
achieve its humanitarian aim in a first phase. True, it enabled the Kosovans 
to return but in doing so it could not prevent additional bitter contest and 
further attempts at ethnic cleansing. Above all, it leaves the intervening 
states with a political responsibility for which they have no political 
concept: there is no clarity about the future of Kosovo. These are hardly 
propitious conditions for a new doctrine. The outcome of the UN-operation 
in East Timor will be crucial for the development of a practice of 
humanitarian intervention. Still the continuing abstention from 
humanitarian intervention in Africa
4 argues against the assumption of a 
new practice, at least a world-wide one. 
1.2 The rediscovery of diplomacy 
At the beginning of Operation "Allied Force", NATO had a position of 
unconditional surrender: the bombing would be stopped only after 
Milosevic had accepted NATO's five conditions. In particular, NATO 
requested a "Framework Agreement" on the basis of the Rambouillet draft 
Agreement (i.e. without UN control, and an "International Military 
Presence", again without a UN umbrella). According to the NATO Summit 
Declaration on Kosovo, (Washington, April 24/25), there was no room for 
concessions on these demands, hence no possibility for negotiations.  
This position proved less and less tenable as public support eroded in key 
countries, and Intra-Alliance consultation problems increased. A "peace 
 
3 Adam Roberts, "NATO's Humanitarian War over Kosovo", in Survival, Autumn 
1999 (vol. 41/No. 3) pp. 102 ff. (120). 
4 C.f. for the latest development in this close low-profile practise of the International 
Community see "UN takes low key role this time in Kongo" in Financial Times, 
September 17, 1999, P. 5. The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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plan" elaborated by Germany met first with sceptical reactions from the 
British and American governments at the Washington NATO summit. The 
turning point came soon after. Starting the second week of May, Moscow 
became the mecca of European and American diplomacy, with German 
State Secretary (Staatssekretär) Ischinger and his American counterpart 
Strobe Talbot as protagonists. It had become clear that not only allied unity 
was at stake but also the chances for a moderate future development in 
Russia. From this time on, hectic activities of coordination and persuasion 
between the Alliance, the European Union, and Russia started. The special 
envoys, Finnish President Achtissary and former Russian Prime Minister 
Tchernomyrdin started their shuttle diplomacy between Western capitals 
and Belgrade. Clearly a "second track" was established.  
Should there be future enforcement missions by NATO, they are likely to 
follow this model. After all the "dual track" approach meets with historic 
experiences of NATO. The Harmel report of 1963 identified a dual strategy 
against the Soviet challenge consisting of military defence plus political co-
operation and dialogue. The NATO Ministerial Meeting of December 1979 
issued a "dual decision" to meet the threat of Russian intermediate nuclear 
missiles: a decision to deploy corresponding weapon systems on the 
territory of the Alliance and an offer to negotiate, on the systems of both 
sides.  
1.3 A new appraisal of NATO's role in peace enforcement 
In the eyes of some, NATO's role is reinforced by its ultimate victory over 
Serbia in particular because it was able to maintain its internal cohesion. 
For Secretary Cohen this was "the most important lesson" from Kosovo.
5  
This evaluation corresponds to powerful interests of the Alliance yet it calls 
for differentiation. NATO simply could not afford to lose this conflict 
between the most powerful military Alliance of history against a state "the 
size of Maine" (Cohens expression). NATO's victory has prevented severe 
damage to its international position, cohesion, and, above all, credibility. 
 
5 In his September 9, 1999 speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
in San Diego, Security Issues Digest from the same day, US Mission to NATO. Günter Joetze 
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But NATO has not achieved its essential war aim, the prevention of a 
humanitarian catastrophe. And it reached a political solution only after 
involving Russia and by giving the UN the control over the interim 
administration of the province. Thus NATO had to accept important 
compromises after its summit had excluded such an outcome six weeks 
before. 
In the wake of Operation "Allied Force", large parts of Western public 
opinion considered NATO the only remaining pillar of the European 
security architecture—the only one "capable of action". The ambition to 
make NATO the center of the European system is reflected by a sentence in 
paragraph 2 of the Washington Summit Communiqué:  
This new Alliance will be larger, more capable and more flexible, committed to 
collective defence and able to undertake new missions including contributing to 
effective conflict prevention and engaging actively in crisis-management including 
crisis response operations.  
The Kosovo experience does not confirm these optimistic predictions: there 
were severe interallied differences, notably about infrastructure targets (not 
a tactical but a strategic issue since it involved the choice between purely 
military efficiency and long-term political considerations).
6 Public support 
in some countries was at times shaky.  
Only history will resolve the question of which factors were decisive for 
Milosevic´s surrender. Possible answers include NATO firmness, the 
change in the attitude of Russia, Serbian fear of an impending NATO 
 
6 C.f. above all the commentary in Süddeutsche Zeitung, August 23, 1999: 
"Schädliche Plaudereien nach dem Krieg" and the corresponding news item at p. 2 
of the same issue. Only for the latest relevation: Karl Feldmayer, "Schweigen nach 
dem Vorfall" in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 5, 1999: On a dispute on 
whether to stop the Russian commando advancing to Prishtina airport. More far 
reaching were the differences between SACEUR and the political authorities of 
most NATO countries on the notification of NATO troop movements to Macedonia. 
Although mandatory under the Vienna Document of 1994 these notifications were 
postponed and Russian demands for inspections denied for security reasons which 
would have made this important instrument of military confidence building a fair 
weather document. Luckily, later troop movements to Albania were duely notified 
and Russian inspection admitted (information given to the author from Vienna 
Arms Control circles). The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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ground attack, or the damage inflicted by the air campaign. Concerning air 
damage, it has been discussed whether losses of the Serbian armed forces 
or the destruction of civilian infrastructure, (notably bridges and power 
plants) were decisive. Losses in Serbian equipment are now defined at 93 
tanks, 153 armored personnel carriers, 339 military vehicles and 389 
artillery pieces. "Those totals amounted to a crippling loss to Serbia´s 
regular armed forces“.
7 Military leaders may use these figures to prove the 
effectiveness of an exclusively airborne campaign. But this argument opens 
a political dilemma: if so, why did some of them insist, and indeed risk 
conflict about, additional targeting of civilian infrastructure?  
When mediation began to complement military action it turned out that 
NATO had no political consultation mechanism which included Russsia 
(the NATO-Russia Council not being sufficiently developed). It was an 
incredibly lucky coincidence that a country with an able and efficient 
diplomacy, Germany, held the presidencies both of the European Union 
and the G7/G8, and that both bodies had summits scheduled for a point in 
time decisive for the resolution of the crisis (end of May/beginning of 
June). This constellation is not likely to repeat itself. In the absence of a 
political crisis-management mechanism NATO should not embark on 
military enforcement in the future. Instead it needs a close co-operation 
with bodies of co-operative security as the United Nations and, in some 
cases, OSCE. NATO should seek the involvement of such bodies at the 
beginning of future crisis-management efforts and not at the end, as in the 
Kosovo crisis.  
1.4 More attention for Russia in future crisis-management 
This implies the involvement of Russia, regardless of its present chaotic 
state. Russia will be needed because of its permanent seat in the Security 
Council. It still makes use of some residual influence in many problem 
areas. It follows that there is a need for a consulting mechanism. In this 
regard the G7/G8 will probably replace the Contact Group. This will 
 
7 C.f. Joseph Fitchett, "NATO lowers its tally of tanks hit in Kosovo" in  
International Herald Tribune, September 17, 1999. Günter Joetze 
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amplify the range of consultation from the Balkans to all crisis areas, and 
will ensure the participation of Japan, and later China (as member of a 
future Group of "G9"), and you arrive at an informally reformed Security 
Council which might prepare the decisions of the official UN body 
according to the Cologne model (where the G8 Foreign Ministers prepared 
outlines of Resolution No. 1244 of the Security Council on Kosovo, which 
were informally consulted over bilateral channels with the only absent 
permanent member, China). 
1.5 The position of the UN and the role of its Security Council are 
reinforced 
At the beginning of Operation "Allied Force" there was a clear trend in the 
West to consider it as a precedent for future self-mandated enforcement 
action. The feeling that a humanitarian catastrophe cannot be allowed in the 
heart of Europe "just because" Russia or China would not agree to a 
Security Council mandate was widespread. Yet, in practice, Russia turned 
out to be indispensable in achieving a settlement; so were discrete efforts to 
engage China. It worked and this will be one of the lessons learned. It is 
ironical but logical that Operation "Allied Force" was started without a 
Security Council resolution but ended with one. Foreign Minister Fischer 
stressed the need of a Security Council Mandate in his UN speech of 
September 22, 1999 in strong terms.  
1.6 The EU will concentrate on Europe and its near surroundings 
Halfway between the Berlin and Washington NATO summits some 
European chancelleries were concerned about American tendencies to 
"globalize" NATO's role. Some voices from Congress claimed a new 
burdensharing between Europeans and Americans, this time by common 
action rather "far out" of area. To the surprise—and relief—of some 
European allies the American negotiators on the NATO Strategic Concept 
did not press the issue hard. The issue was settled in the text of the 
Strategic Concept by the flexible term "Euro-Atlantic area" which implies 
that NATO's sphere of activities is not worldwide. At the time of the The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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Washington NATO Summit (end of April) a German observer remarked 
that this term leaves room for political flexibility:  
It would probably exclude South East Asia. But a crisis in the Gulf area would be a case 
for political discussion and assessment of interest.
8  
Such discussions would certainly be marked by caution after recent 
experiences. True, there remain some neuralgic spots in the Balkans such 
as the unrest in Macedonia or Northern Albania, or a pro-Serbian putsch in 
Montenegro. In such cases additional military engagement by NATO 
would seem inevitable for reasons of continuity and contiguity, and would 
seem feasible because of their limited nature. There might be a need for 
military intervention elsewhere, such as in crises in the Southern 
Mediterranean, but the more likely platform for them would be "coalitions 
of the willing" led by the US, or by a European country with predominant 
regional interest, but probably not by NATO as an Alliance and certainly 
not by the EU which will lack the prerequisites for such action for the 
forseeable future.  
1.7 For the European Union, a shift of attention from North to 
South 
Balkan issues now constitute Europe's paramount stability concern. This 
will probably lead to a shift of financial support from East Central Europe 
to South East Europe, a trend already manifest in the funds provided by the 
German Ministry of Co-operation and Development for German party 
foundations. The various EU funds for preparing for or inducing countries 
to EU membership might suffer similiar changes.  
Such a trend will not go undisputed. Scandinavian EU members will 
challenge it. Already, the Finnish EU Presidency has convened a 
Conference of Foreign Ministers on the Nordic Dimension of the EU to 
Helsinki on November 12. The possible consequences of such a trend will 
be discussed below under Chapter 2.3.  
 
8 Frankenberger in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 30, 1999. Günter Joetze 
10 
1.8 A drastic demonstration of American military superiority 
For the experts, Operation "Allied Force" brought nothing new in this field. 
But to the broad public and to political leaders the extent of American 
superiority came as a shock. "The US conducted two-thirds of all supply 
sorties and about half of all combat sorties" said Secretary Cohen in his San 
Diego speech already quoted. The Secretary goes on in cautious language 
designed to spare Allied feelings:  
Because we are the only nation with precision-guided ammunitions that can operate in 
all kinds of weather, heavy cloud cover in the early phases of the campaign at times 
made it an almost exclusively American operation. Moreover, not all of our Allies 
possessed interoperable communications equipment. 
Many European armed forces are still equipped with weapons designed for 
conventional defence against a Soviet land attack in an all-out war where 
the political requirements of "no friendly casualties" and "no collateral 
damage" would not apply. Military enforcement action in future ethnic 
conflicts will always be guided by these two principles. Hence the need for 
European governments to thoroughly restructure and re-equip their armed 
forces if they want to prepare themselves for this type of conflict.  
Unavoidably, the American superiority led to tendencies of unilateralism. 
In the last period of the campaign General Clark apparently disregarded 
French and German objections against civilian targeting.
9 There were two 
lines of command, one purely American for US sorties and an interallied 
one for others. Satellite information was not always shared as the German 
defence minister experienced when he needed documentation on recent 
Serbian atrocities to keep his party left in line. European military inferiority 
entailed incompatibility in communication and command.  
In the longer run, these developments could lead to a diminished European 
influence with the Alliance. To a foreign observer, European participation 
 
9 C.f. above note 7. The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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in the Gulf War, but certainly in Operation "Allied Force" appeared largely 
symbolic.
10 
American superiority did not mean American infallibility. Information 
dominance as an aim of the "revolution in military affairs" is not achieved 
by technical means alone but also requires an up-to-date city map of 
Belgrade, as we now all are aware of. The accidental bombing of the 
Chinese Embassy nearly ruined the chances of a political settlement by 
antagonizing a permanent member of the Security Council. After the 
accidental death of a group of Kosovans mistaken for a Serbian army unit 
and of passengers of a train hit by bombs when passing a railway bridge, 
one more human tragedy might have caused the break-down of popular 
support in member countries of the Alliance. One of the basic differences 
between humanitarian enforcement actions and a traditional war conducted 
for central national interests is this: only in the latter case is a democratic 
nation prepared to suffer and to make others suffer.  
1.9 A profound disappointment in Russia about the West 
Operation "Allied Force" achieved what four decades of Soviet and 
communist propaganda failed to achieve: to make the Russians believe that 
NATO is an aggressive block".
11 This new attitude towards NATO and the 
West is expressed by the commentator of Moscow's independent television 
station Alexej Pushkow as an "enforced partnership". These feelings are 
widespread in Russia. They are certainly not confined to elites or to the 
political class. Several reasons exist for this development:  
- The awareness of a hopelessly inferior position of Russia vis-á-vis 
NATO and the West in general in all spheres including the conventional 
military. 
 
10 The noted commentator of the Russian private television Jury Pushkov in a 
discussion at the Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, reported by Wolf Bell in 
"Noch keine Lehren, aber viele Fragen", Generalanzeiger, August 23, 1999 
11 Aleksej Arbatov in a discussion at a seminar of the Bundesakademie für 
Sicherheitspolitik in Moscow, May 5, 1999. Günter Joetze 
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- Consequently, the fear of being exposed to similar action by NATO in 
another case like in Chechnya. 
- Experiences like the recent events in Dagestan and Chechnya which 
demonstrate to the average Russian that he is indeed exposed to this kind 
of danger. 
- A deeply rooted legal tradition of legal positivism, hence, scepticism vis-
á-vis all those concepts that the West evokes to justify what in technical 
terms amounts to a violation of the United Nations Charter such as: 
natural law, a developing humanitarian International Law, or the 
specifically German concept of "over-constitutional law". 
Under Primakov's tenure as Prime Minister, these sentiments determined 
the official position of Russia towards NATO. In a later development, 
President Yeltsin changed this course, appointing Tchernomyrdin as his 
special envoy, and shortly afterwards deposing Primakov as Prime 
Minister. These steps reinforced Russia's international position as they 
emphasized its key role for a political settlement. However, feelings of 
anger and resentment have not faded away. They will have after-effects for 
a long time to come. Inside the country the credibility of the President has 
suffered another, possibly fatal, blow. While co-operation with the West is 
widely accepted as a pragmatic necessity, Western economic order and 
Western economic advice, will for a longer period remain discredited as a 
model. Moreover, since a strong section of the Russian public now 
considers NATO as an "aggressive block", the accession of the Baltic 
republics to NATO will be met by even deeper resentment. This effect will, 
in turn, not be lost on NATO policy makers. 
1.10 An increase of Third World scepticism about the West 
In a limited way NATO's image has improved in some Muslim circles 
because NATO defended a Muslim population. But this could change if the 
relations between the Albanians and the KFOR troops deteriorate. Seen 
globally, preoccupations prevail, not only because of the original neglect of 
the UN system by the West, but also because of a widespread fear of a 
precedent of intervention in similar cases of internal ethnic conflict. From a The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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Western point of view, the difference between internal and interstate 
conflicts may seem obsolete; such a perception would seem justified in the 
OECD hemisphere where globalization leads to the development of civil 
societies, which recognize ethnic tolerance, even ethnic diversity, as a 
governing principle. In many parts of the Third World things are different. 
States are weak, have mostly artificial borders and consequently are beset 
by minority problems. Military interventions in these problems from 
outside are thus bound to be seen as a dangerous precedent and only 
acceptable under a Security Council mandate. 
The concept of humanitarian intervention is mostly considered a unilateral 
act in which the West applies double standards. The Western argument that 
"NATO's 19 democracies" are representative for new and more human 
trends in International Law is unacceptable to the average Third World 
politician. In the eyes of analysts from countries exposed to dangers from 
Islamic societies (Russians, but also Israelis) the precedent of a unilateral 
action based on strongly held convictions is doubly dangerous: What about 
similar actions by the countries of the Islamic Conference, possibly acting 
on the strength of a fatwa?  
For these reasons, the Kosovo affair increased the malaise already existing 
in Third World countries. It may reinforce the already existing trends 
towards proliferation in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in 
this area. 
2. Consequences for the European Union 
2.1 Military Security 
It would seem natural that the military inferiority of the Europeans 
evidenced by the Kosovo affair should strengthen their determination to 
reinforce both the European Defence Identity within NATO and the 
European Defence and Security Policy within the European Union. The 
Cologne Declaration "On strengthening the Common European Policy on 
Security and Defence" (Annex III to the Presidency Conclusions of the 
Cologne European Council of June 1999) would suggest such a Günter Joetze 
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determination. The document is full of strong declarations of intent. So is 
the Defence Capabilities Initiative which was issued at the NATO summit 
in Washington. The latter document specifies potential threats to Alliance 
security as resulting from "regional conflicts, ethnic strifes or other crises 
beyond Alliance territory". Correspondingly it asks for leaner forces, 
capable of rapid deployment and of interoperability, with improved 
Command and Control, in particular through technologically advanced 
information systems.  
These are limited goals. If Alliance members achieved them they would at 
least be capable of cooperating with American forces but still with inferior 
firepower. The technological gap between the American and European 
forces would still be wide (c.f. above chapter 1.8). France and the United 
Kingdom are working on structural reforms corresponding to the Defence 
Capabilities Initiative. The German defence budget, however, has recently 
been cut by no less than 7,6%. Without a drastic structural reform probably 
affecting conscription, Germany could not follow suit. At present, no 
political will is recognizable in Germany to take the decisions necessary to 
this end. They are, however, unvoidable: In a time of dramatic shortage of 
revenues, no responsible Minister of Finance could give priority to defence 
spending over vital civilian needs without cogent reasons. Such reasons are 
not discernable, as there simply is no credible military threat justifying 
large forces for territorial defence.
12 Nor is there room for additional large- 
scale peacekeeping operations: The Balkan enterprises (SFOR and KFOR) 
will absorb German and European capabilities for a long period so that in 
other cases a more symbolic participation will be the only option (c.f. the 
 
12 There, certainly, is no more conventional threat from Russia. Should Russia ever 
regain the financial means to rebuild a conventional force capable of attacking 
NATO and the political will to do so as some analysts still will not exclude, the 
confrontational line would be advanced from the river Elbe to the river Bug about a 
thousand kilometres to the East, and it would take seven to ten years to rebuild 
corresponding Russian forces. No responsible planning could be based on such 
assumptions. Insofar as there is a residual nuclear threat from Russia this would not 
be a subject for common European action of any kind but a reserved domain for the 
three nuclear powers. Ballistic missiles from a rogue state are a remote contingency, 
not to be dealt with by a conscript army. The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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British contingent of 250 Gurkhas to the operation in East Timor and the 
German medical unit dispatched to Northern Australia to assist this 
operation). There are, of cause, plausible scenarios of ethnic conflicts in the 
"Euro-Atlantic area". But few, if any, of them would call for independent 
European military action under German participation.
13 
To sum up: In terms of military structures, a Common European Defence 
Policy is having a bad beginning. This is bound to lead to disagreeable 
differences within the Alliance as well as between Europeans. Germany is 
likely to be identified as the main culprit for slow progress in this field.  
Let us now turn from force structures to structures of the decision-making 
process. In this respect, high hopes are placed in the future High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, Javier Solana. 
However, an analysis of the relevant treaty provision demonstrates the 
difficulties he will meet:  
According to the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) as amended in 
Amsterdam, the Union could introduce a Common Defence Policy if the 
European Council so decides. Such a decision would take the form of a 
"recommendation" from the Council to member states, which they would 
have to implement "according to their own constitutional provisions". This 
indicates that implementation is not around the corner. Paragraph 2 of 
article 17 of the TEU includes "combat missions and crisis-management 
including peace enforcing missions" into the possible tasks of an European 
defence policy. The Cologne declaration stresses to this end that "the Union 
must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so in order to 
respond to international crises". The authors hastened to add: "without 
 
13 For a long time there will remain a need to station forces in the Balkans (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia). This need will absorb most European countries. 
In the Southern Caucasus, action plans have been prepared. This planned most 
imaginable crisis in the Persian Gulf, the Greater Middle East or in North Africa 
would require American participation and American command. Crises in this area 
which the United States consider a purely European affair are difficult to imgine. It 
follows that there is very little room for European military actions, be it under the 
NATO umbrella or even less so under an independent EU/WEU command. Günter Joetze 
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prejudice to actions by NATO". This text provides a useful guide through 
various problems:  
- As to "the capacity for autonomous actions", the Union has not reached 
it as long as there is no basic agreement on a common defence policy 
(see above). It has not created the institutional framework. The WEU 
would provide such a framework once it were in a position to prepare 
and execute actions of the European Union of a defence nature 
(paragraph 3 of article 17). This would require, according to the same 
paragraph, a set of "practical arrangements" notably on the relations 
between the original WEU members and the Non-NATO members 
(Austria and Ireland) of this organization, as well as its "Associated 
Members" and "Associated Partners". The present author admires the 
intellectual capacity of those who are able to penetrate this messy 
conglomerate of overlapping memberships between NATO, EU and 
WEU with a view to make common military actions possible, in 
particular in cases where NATO assets would be used, and Non-NATO 
and WEU-members could participate.  
- "Backed by credible military forces": This is a political aim for the mid-
term future. At present the forces of EU members do not constitute a 
credible armed force capable of more than post-conflict interposition (as 
presently in the Balkans), and certainly not for independent European 
military enforcement.  
- "The means to decide to use them": if this somewhat vague term refers 
to voting procedures, the answer is in the treaty: Its article 23 requires 
unanimity for decisions with military or defence policy implications.  
- "A readiness to do so": As stated, a series of complicated negotiations 
would be needed before the EU would be able to lead military 
operations, indeed with or without NATO assets in capabilities. These 
negotiations will prove highly sensitive as they imply sacrifices in 
traditions and in sovereignty, cost money and above all, require political 
willpower—another scare commodity which will also be needed in 
important other fields, such as enlargement negotiations, and structural 
reform.  The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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In conclusion, in spite of an impressive amount of paperwork both on the 
official level with its high-sounding declarations and on the analytical level 
with its abundance of sharp-witted analyses, only extremely slow progress 
can be expected towards the goal of a Europe capable of military action, be 
it under the NATO umbrella or, even less, on its own. This will disappoint 
public opinion in many countries, given the expectations raised by the 
offical rhetoric, and Germany risks exposing itself as the scapegoat for the 
deficits.  
2.2 Foreign Policy of the EU – non-military elements 
Let us first state in passing that long-term, the EU is unlikely to develop 
into the role of a power broker in major crisis areas such as the Middle-
East. In Iraq, France and Britain pursue opposite policies. The Middle East 
peace process is the most notable example of the "Sarajevo syndrome". Just 
as the Sarajevo airport was built with EU money and inaugurated by the US 
Secretary of Defence, the EU too often assumes the role of the paymaster 
and leaves the political control to the United States. In spite of the 
unhappiness expressed by politicians and public opinion about this division 
of labour, the European Union has continued to accept it, again in Dayton 
for Bosnia, and recently in Cologne for Kosovo where, again, the EU has 
the task only of rebuilding the infrastructure of the province. The general 
public accepts a broader activity of EU institutions in supporting regional 
co-operation with the aim of stabilizing certain areas. Such efforts are 
underway in the Baltic Sea co-operation, or in supporting the co-operation 
between Georgia, Ukraine, Usbekistan and Moldowa (GUUA). In the latter 
case, the support goes into co-operation in the field of transport and oil and 
gas pipelines. This could contribute to a stabilization of the areas of making 
its member states less dependent on Russia, induce them to co-operation 
and improve their infrastructure.
14 A widely unknown example of such 
 
14 C.f. instead of many: A. Missiroli, "Towards a European Security and Defense 
Identity?", in Matthias Jopp and Hermann Ojanen (Eds), European Security 
Integration: Implications for Non-alignment and Alliances, Programme of the 
Western European Union, Northern Dimension of the SFSP, vol.3, Helsinki et al. 
1999, p. 21. Günter Joetze 
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stabilizing efforts by the EU is the meeting of the Presidents of Armenia, 
Georgia and Azerbaidjan in Luxembourg in June 1999 at the occasion of 
these countries´ respective co-operation agreements with the EU. This was 
the first common declaration by the three Presidents. The declaration could 
of course not solve the existing political problems, in particular not the 
conflict of Nagorno-Kharabagh but it declared co-operation in economic 
and infrastructure issues possible, in particular with new pipelines. In this 
context the declaration contains an important political statement, namely 
that the tracing of such lines should be guided by economic considerations. 
With these principles, the three Presidents have distanced themselves from 
American efforts to plan new pipelines through South East Turkey to 
prevent cheaper transit through Russia and, above all, Iran.  
2.3  The Stability Pact for South-East Europe 
This "Pact" is the most ambitious project of these regional efforts. It is not 
a legal instrument but a political initiative which unites all states of the area 
and the European Union as its sponsor and player of a "leading role". The 
Founding Document of 10 June 1999, is also signed by the Non-EU 
Members of the G-8, i.e. the United States, Canada, Japan and Russia. The 
aims of the Pact are described in broad terms and include everything to 
make the area an island of happiness. The restoration of stability in Kosovo 
is to be part of a wider strategy.  
The document contains a pledge by the countries of the area to co-operate 
closely. It is the first time that all countries of the region have entered into 
such a pledge. This is a new and promising element. Regional stability can 
only be achieved if all states between the Alps and the Aegean Sea conduct 
continuous political consultations and co-operate together in various 
economic fields. It probably was this wide extension of the area which 
enabled all states, notably Croatia and Slovenia, to associate themselves.  
It remains to be seen whether the States of the area implement their 
commitments in good faith and whether the main sponsor, the European 
Union, will carry out its "expressed determination". This would mean to 
elevate regional stability in South-East Europe to one of the central tasks 
for the European Union for the years to come. It would rank as high on the The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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EU agenda as a new comprehensive Intergovernmental Conference on the 
structures of the Union as proposed by the new President of the 
Commission, Prodi, as the current and future enlargement negotiations, and 
the preparations for a Common Security and Defence Policy. 
The mechanisms of this Stability Pact provide for a Special Co-ordinator 
which is the German politican Bodo Hombach. There are to be three 
Working Tables—one on the human dimension, one on economics, and 
one on security issues. These tables should work out "arrangements" 
between the participants. This institutional framework is flexible and leaves 
room for interpretation. This could be an advantage if the process gains 
momentum. This, however, cannot be taken for granted as the following 
short discussion of the possible programs of the three "Tables" 
demonstrates:  
- As to Table 1, problems of democratisation and human rights, in 
particular those of minorities, were also in the centre of negotiations 
initiated by the first Stability Pact proposed by the European Union in 
Copenhagen and culminating in the Paris Conference in 1994. It brought 
progress for the position of certain minorities, in particular between 
Hungary and its neighbours Slovakia and Romania. So far there is a need 
for constant survey of implementation of the existing obligations. The 
remaining minorities in Serbia (Hungarians in Vojvodjna and Bosnians 
in the Sandjak) can only be addressed after Serbia is admitted as a 
participant to the Pact. This is made dependent on the end of the 
Milosevic era. The problems in the two international protectorates 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo) will mainly be dealt with by the 
respective administrations. It is difficult to see how their solution could 
be promoted by the activities of a "Table" of the Stability Pact. At best, 
this Table would replace the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna as a 
debating place and clearing house for problems in this field.  
- Similar considerations apply to the Working Table on Security Issues. 
Insofar as there is a concrete need for regional arms control, this has 
already been dealt with in the respective provisions of the Dayton 
agreement. Under article III of Annex 1b of this Agreement, a  
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satisfactory set of confidence— and security—building measures was 
worked out. The new Table "could be used to reanimate this set of rules 
after the end of the hostilities in and around Kosovo“. Measures for 
subregional arms control under article IV of Annex 1b were under active 
consideration by the partners before the war broke out. Their present 
state is unclear. It is unlikely that Serbia is presently prepared to continue 
in negotiations. A broader regional arms control agreement according to 
article V of Annex 1b would be good subject for future activities of this 
"Table" but not before Serbia is admitted. Pending this, the table could 
render useful services as a day-to-day permanent debating forum for 
security issues. Here again, the problem of duplicating work done in the 
OSCE exists. Apart from military security, this Working Table will also 
form a subgroup on "democratic policing" which is meant to acquaint 
regional leaders with Westen-style political correctness in police 
methods—an ardous task indeed.  
- The second Table on economic issues should develop into the central 
element of the initiative. It is a long-term task, given the already-existing 
deficits in infrastructure and the additional massive damage to 
infrastructure notably in Serbia. A long-term engagement of all donors, 
in particular major EU countries, is a prerequisite. The Vienna European 
Council of 1998 tasked the Commission to elaborate a Common Strategy 
for the Western Balkans. This document will allow to judge whether the 
EU has a feasible concept. The Cologne European Council provided for 
the creation of a Special Agency for implementing such reconstruction 
programs. This agency was supposed to start its work before the end of 
this summer, a deadline which has already proved unrealistic. However, 
such an agency is badly needed: International assistance in 
administrating aid is necessary. At present, the funds under the PHARE 
and TACIS programs of the EU in many cases could not flow into the 
region because of the incapacity of countries to elaborate projects and to 
administer their execution.  
- The greatest hope opened by the Stability Pact Initiative is not material 
reconstruction. Efforts in this field would only provide a framework and 
the incentive for a change in deeply rooted habits in the area. The The European Security Landscape after Kosovo 
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countries of the Balkans could, by working and discussing together on a 
permanent basis, establish broad contacts and become used to concrete 
co-operation. The prospect of EU membership may be an incentive. At 
the forthcoming European Council in Helsinki, Romania and Bulgaria 
will have their negotiations opened, although the economic and 
administrative realities will not allow concrete discussions on the "acquis 
communautaire" in any field. With the exception of Serbia and Moldova, 
all other countries have at least obtained a recognition of the possibility 
to become a member—no mean achievement for a country like Albania. 
To be sure, their EU perspective is still extremely dim. The terminology 
used in the respective passages of the Cologne Council Conclusions and 
the Stability Pact Initiative is guarded and highly conditional ("closer to 
the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures", 
point 20 of the Stability Pact document). Yet, the recognition of 
eligibility might serve as an encouragement. The exclusion of Moldova, 
whose structural and economic problems are comparable to those of 
Albania is intriguing. Apparently, the old concept of former Commission 
President Delors of the two pillars of European stability —EU and CIS 
— still looms around. It has passed its time: the EU is already an 
efficient provider of "soft security" in the post Soviet space, notably in 
the South Caucasus area.
15  
To sum up: the most promising activities of the EU in the field of Security 
are of "soft" but efficient nature: in conflict prevention and post-conflict 
co-operation by providing material resources and inspiring regional co-
operation. The Balkan Stability Pact gives the EU a chance to develop from 
a mere provider of money and advice into a political player that co- 
 
 
15 C.f. Friedemann Müller/ Claude Zullo (Eds), "The European Union and the 
Caucasus Region: Oil, Interests, and Influence", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; 
c.f. also: Detlev Wolter "Die Kaukasus-Politik der Europäischen Union", Aus 
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B42/99, pp 32-39.  Wolter gives a detailed resumé of the 
various programs and activities, stresses their stabilizing effects and their potential, 
both for the area and the EU's international role. He, too, emphasizes the Meeting of 
the three Caucasian Presidents on June 22, 1999, and their common Declaration, to 
which he ascribes "historic relevance". Günter Joetze 
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determines the political shape of an area. However, the outcome is 
uncertain. The initiative still runs the risk of ending in confusion
16 or 
coming under American political control (for which there are preliminary 
indications
17). Should it be positive, the political profile of CFSP would be 
much enhanced, and Mr Solana's chances improved.  
3. Conclusions 
Operation "Allied Force" has brought some clarifications and has changed 
certain trends. The Balkans will absorb a good deal of European political 
energy and even more of Europe's military capacities. Several European 
NATO Members may be more prudent to resort to military intervention. 
Such actions will be more likely to be reinforced by diplomatic efforts from 
the outset. Global institutions like the United Nations and OSCE have 
proved to be more useful than anticipated. NATO survived its first war 
intact but may be used less frequently in the future for limited military 
intervention. The shock and disappointment among European politicians 
about their countries' military inferiority that became evident during the 
war will probably not lead to a radical change and the quick establishment 
of a European defence identity within and even less outside of NATO.  
Though being a watershed in several security developments, Operation 
"Allied Force" did not open a new era in regional history. More likely, it 
opened the concluding chapter of a former period, that of the wars of 
succession between the Republics of the former Greater Yugoslavia, by the 
establishment of an international protectorate over the Serbian province of 
Kosovo. Although it is categorically excluded in all existing international 
documents this could lead to the independence of the province, with the 
possible formal maintenance of nominal Serbian sovereignty.  
 
16 So drastically Erhard Busek, "Die Kosovo-Hilfe ist ein Pfusch" ("The Help for 
Kosovo is a botched-up job") in Die Welt, October 12, 1999. 
17 There is a strong American influence on the substance matters to discuss in the 
Third Working Table. In particular the concept of "democratic policing" is 
advanced.  
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Three more military conflicts are possible in the future: A first one about 
the status of Kosovo, a second one (which could be part of the former) 
about the separation of areas inhabited by Serbians from the main part of 
Kosovo, and another, much later, about the formation of a Greater Albania. 
Before it comes to all this, Europe should have acquired the "capacity for 
autonomous action" as discussed above in part 2.1 of this essay. Europe 
may have a couple of years to develop the region. If it fails to do so, two 
scenarios are possible: 
- Either, the US will again act as the sole peacemaker and political arbiter, 
or, 
- there will be no effective outside intervention and mediation, and the 
Balkans will end in chaos. 
In both cases, the EU would have lost its last chance to establish itself as a 
political factor. 
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